Faith and Politics: (New) Confucianism as Civil Religion by DESSEIN, Bart
Asian Studies II (XVIII), 1 (2014), pp. 39–64 
 
39 
 
Faith and Politics: (New) Confucianism as Civil Religion 
 
Bart DESSEIN
*
 
Abstract 
This paper discusses how, in contemporary China, politico-religious narratives that 
reiterate the country’s Confucian tradition serve to create a sense of belonging and 
sharedness in a community, and provide a way to interpret this community and the 
contemporary Chinese nation as having a divine mission. As these Chinese foundational 
myths combine elements of Confucianism with patriotism and nationalism, they can be 
interpreted as a constitutive element of a “civil religion with Chinese characteristics”, and 
as providing arguments for a “religious” legitimation of the CCP as organization that has 
to lead the nation on this mission. 
Keywords: Confucianism, New Confucianism, civil religion, political rhetoric 
Izvleček  
Članek razpravlja o tem, kako sodobne kitajskepolitično-religiozne pripovedi, ki vedno 
znova govorijo o državni konfucijski tradiciji, služijo za ustvarjanje občutka pripadnosti in 
sodelovanja v skupnosti in tako zagotavljajo način interpretacije te skupnosti in sodobnega 
kitajskega naroda, kot bi imeli božje poslanstvo. Ker ti kitajski fundamentalni miti 
združujejo elemente konfucianizma s patriotizmom in nacionalnizmom, jih je mogoče 
razlagati kot sestavne elemente “ljudske religije s kitajskimi značilnostmi”, in tako 
zagotaljajo argumente za “versko” legitimacijo CCP kot organizacije, ki mora voditi narod 
na tem poslanstvu.  
Ključne besede: konfucianizem, novi konfucianizem, ljudske religije, politična retorika 
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Historiography is a form of symbolical representation of the world,  
helping us to understand it by (re-)constructing it. 
(Mittag and Mutschler 2009, 434) 
 
The Power of Historical Narratives 
In his speech delivered on 28 August 2013 on the occasion of the 50
th
 anniversary 
of the March on Washington, President Barack Obama stated: 
[…] We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are equal, that they 
are endowed by their creator with certain unalienable rights, that among these 
are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness […] And then, on a hot summer 
day, they assembled here, in our nation’s capital, under the shadow of the 
great emancipator, to offer testimony of injustice, to petition their government 
for redress and to awaken America’s long-slumbering consciousness. […] In 
the face of hatred, they prayed for their tormentors. In the face of violence, 
they stood up and sat in with the moral force of nonviolence. Willingly, they 
went to jail to protest unjust laws, their cells swelling with the sound of 
freedom songs. A lifetime of indignities had taught them that no man can take 
away the dignity and grace that God grants us. […] And because they kept 
marching, America changed. […] Because they marched, America became 
more free and more fair, not just for African-Americans but for women and 
Latinos, Asians and Native Americans, for Catholics, Jews and Muslims, for 
gays, for Americans with disabilities. America changed for you and for me. 
And the entire world drew strength from that example, whether it be young 
people who watched from the other side of an Iron Curtain and would 
eventually tear down that wall or the young people inside South Africa who 
would eventually end the scourge of apartheid. […] as people of all colors and 
creeds live together and learn together and walk together, and fight alongside 
one another and love one another, and judge one another by content of our 
character in this greatest nation on Earth. […] The March on Washington 
teaches us that we are not trapped by the mistake of history, that we are 
masters of our fate. But it also teaches us that the promise of this nation will 
only be kept when we work together. […] That’s where courage comes from, 
when we turn not from each other or on each other but towards each one 
another, and we find that we do not walk alone. That’s where courage comes 
from. […] And that’s the lesson of our past, that’s the promise of tomorrow, 
that in the face of impossible odds, people who love their country can change 
it. And when millions of Americans of every race and every region, every 
faith and every station can join together in a spirit of brotherhood, then those 
mountains will be made low, and those rough places will be made plain, and 
those crooked places, they straighten out towards grace, and we will vindicate 
the faith of those who sacrificed so much and live up to the true meaning of 
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our creed as one nation under God, indivisible, with liberty and justice for 
all.
1
 (italics mine) 
President Barack Obama’s call thus is a renewal of Martin Luther King’s appeal to 
the nation, an appeal that, in a context of prevailing segregation, indeed was a 
milestone in the realization of the “American dream” for all who, regardless of 
race or faith, live in the United States. The speech contains the elements that 
incarnate America’s promise: America is the greatest nation on earth; those living 
in America are created by God and have equal and unalienable rights granted to 
them by this God––a claim that entails a connection between the secular realm and 
the realm of the divine––; and the Americans have the natural and moral duty to, 
in a spirit of brotherhood and building on the past, change their country for the 
better, and to be the model for the entire world to shape their future.  
The extant versions of ancient Chinese philosophical and historical works in a 
similar way testify of the conviction that the inhabitants of the ‘Middle Kingdom’ 
(Zhongguo) are of divine origin and have a divine mission. Such elements can be 
traced as far back in history as the Shijing (Book of Odes).
2
 In the translation by 
Arthur Waley (1954, 241–43), the ode “Sheng min” (The Birth of [our] People) of 
this classic work (Part III, Book II, 1) that describes the birth of the Zhou people 
goes as follows: 
She who in the beginning gave birth to the people, 
This was Chiang Yüan (Jiangyuan). 
How did she give birth to the people? 
Well, she sacrificed and prayed 
That she might no longer be childless. 
She trod on the big toe of God’s footprint, 
Was accepted and got what she desired. 
Then in reverence, then in awe 
She gave birth, she nurtured; 
And this was Hou Chi (Houji; Lord Millet). 
 
Indeed, she had fulfilled her months, 
And her first-born came like a lamb 
With no bursting or rending, 
With no hurt or harm. 
To make manifest His magic power 
                                                 
1 Transcript courtesy of Federal News Service. 
2 On the nature of the extant Mao shi version of the Odes and its importance for Confucianism as 
civil religion: see further in this article. 
Bart DESSEIN: Faith and Politics: (New) Confucianism as Civil Religion 
42 
God on high gave her ease. 
So blessed were her sacrifice and prayer 
That easily she bore her child. 
 
Indeed, they put it in a narrow lane; 
But oxen and sheep tenderly cherished it. 
Indeed, they
3
 put it in a far-off wood; 
But it chanced that woodcutters came to this wood. 
Indeed, they put it on the cold ice; 
But the birds covered it with their wings. 
The birds at last went away, 
And Hou Chi (Houji) began to wail. 
 
Truly far and wide 
His voice was very loud. 
Then sure enough he began to crawl; 
Well he straddled, well he reared, 
To reach food for his mouth. 
He planted large beans; 
His beans grew fat and tall. 
His paddy-lines were close set, 
His hemp and wheat grew thick, 
His young gourds teemed. 
 
Truly Hou Chi’s (Houji) husbandry 
Followed the way that had been shown. 
He cleared away the thick grass, 
He planted the yellow crop. 
It failed nowhere, it grew thick, 
It was heavy, it was tall, 
It sprouted, it eared, 
It was firm and good, 
It nodded, it hung––  
He made house and home in T’ai (Tai).
4
 
 
Indeed, the lucky grains were sent down to us, 
The black millet, the double-kernelled, 
Millet pink-sprouted and white. 
Far and wide the black and the double-kernelled 
He reaped and acred; 
Far and wide the millet pink and white 
                                                 
3 Waley (1954, 241, note # 2) remarks that “The ballad does not tell us who exposed the child. 
According to one version it was the mother herself; according to another, her husband.” 
4 Waley (1954, 242, note # 2) specifies T’ai as “South-west of Wu-kung Hsien, west of Sianfu. Said 
to be where his mother came from.” 
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He carried in his arms, he bore on his back, 
Brought them home, and created the sacrifice. 
 
Indeed, what are they, our sacrifices? 
We pound the grain, we bale it out, 
We sift, we tread, 
We wash it––soak, soak; 
We boil it all steamy. 
Then with due care, due thought 
We gather southernwood, make offering of fat, 
Take lambs for the rite of expiation, 
We roast, we broil, 
To give a start to the coming year. 
 
High we load the stands, 
The stands of wood and of earthenware. 
As soon as the smell rises 
God on high is very pleased: 
‘What smell is this, so strong and good?’ 
Hou Chi (Houji) founded the sacrifices, 
And without blemish or flaw 
They have gone on till now. 
This narrative arguably is the first Chinese historical narrative, and to the extent 
that it connects the origin of the “Chinese” people to the realm of the divine, may 
also by regarded as the first “religious” narrative. Apart from the connection 
between the secular realm and the realm of the divine, it shares some more of the 
concepts that were also present in the above quoted passage of President Barack 
Obama’s speech: once born through divine intervention,
5
 the Chinese people keep 
enjoying divine intervention; agriculture––the economic backbone of the “Middle 
Kingdom”––flourishes through divine intervention;
6
 and the people are grateful 
for this divinity and bring sacrificial offers to ensure further divine help. By the 
time of the Zhou dynasty (1046–771/770–256) and Confucius (551?–479 BCE), 
further, a hierarchical feudal government headed by the “Son of Heaven” (tianzi) 
had become recognized, and this socio-political model had become reflected in 
religion, as “the spirits of the dead, nature divinities, and political deities like the 
                                                 
5 Schwartz (1985, 30) remarks that the God (di) to which the first stanza of this ode refers, is not a 
deified ancestor, “but the nonhuman high god who engendered the dynasty.” 
6 Waley (1954, 242, note # 1) remarks that the sentence “Followed the way that had been shown” is 
reminiscent of the following line of the ode Si wen of Part IV, Book I, 10 of the Shijing: “You gave 
us wheat and barley in obedience to God’s command” (translated by Waley 1954, 160). It may also 
be reiterated here that some of the sage rulers of antiquity (the san huang and the wu di), are directly 
or indirectly related to agriculture. 
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god of the Land and Grain, were arranged under a supreme god, who […] was 
called Heaven (tian) or the Emperor on High (shangdi)”. (Shryock 1966, 4–5) 
This “Emperor on High” (Waley’s “God on high”) thus became regarded as the 
divine double of the “Son of Heaven”, the secular ruler (wang) whose reign was, 
through its connection with the realm of the divine, conceived as a divine 
enterprise. This connection between the realm of the divine and the realm of the 
secular made it possible that the ruler was perceived as the representative of 
heaven on earth. The concept of “divine rulership” that comes with this perception, 
was sanctioned with the promotion of Confucianism to the status of official 
ideology in the Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE), as this development was shaped 
within the religious-cultural heritage of the Zhou.
7
 According to the philosophers 
of the New Text School of Han Confucianism, most important exponent of whom 
is Dong Zhongshu (179?–104? BCE), a major figure in the promotion of 
Confucianism to the status of official ideology, any change in one of the 
constituents of the holistic world––consisting of heaven, man, and earth––
naturally has its effect on the other constituents.
8
 This explains why Joseph 
Needham (1958, 281–82) called this type of Confucianism “cosmological 
Conficianism”.9 The politico-religious character of Confucian rule implies that it is 
the task of the ruler to safeguard the harmony between all constituent parts of the 
holistic world, and also explains the popular etymology of the character for 
“wang”, ruler (king), that is mentioned in Xu Shen’s (ca.58–ca.147 CE) Shuo wen 
jie zi, the oldest extant etymological dictionary of the Chinese language. Here we 
read that, according to Dong Zhongshu, it is so that “when depictions (wen) were 
created in olden [times], three strokes that were connected through the middle 
were called “wang”. The three are heaven, earth and men, and the one who 
connects them is the “ruler” (wang)”. (Shuo wen jie zi 1988, 7b) The belief that 
ancestors (belonging to the realm of the divine) are able to intervene in this life 
                                                 
7 Dull (1994, 3) remarks that the reign of Emperor Wu (140–87 BCE) of the Han dynasty is the 
period in which Confucianism for the first time was recognized as the “ism”, “to the exclusion of all 
others, that was to be acceptable to the state and was to become the object of study for those who 
hoped for official careers”. Yu (2005, 34) remarks that the politico-religious narrative of 
Confucianism, in fact, builds on the system that was developed already in the Shang dynasty (trad. 
1766–1122 BCE), when ancestors were transformed from kin to symbols of divine power. 
8 The intricate connection between the realm of secular governance and the realm of the divine is 
also reflected in the references to the Shijing in the Confucian Lunyu (Analects). References to the 
Shijing are: Book I, chap. xv, 3; Book II, chap. ii; Book III, chap. viii, 3; Book VII, chap. xvii; Book 
VIII, chap. viii, 1; Book XIII, chap. v; Book XVI, chap. xiii, 2, 5; Book XVII, chap. ix, 1, 2. For the 
significance of the fact that the Lunyu refers to the Shijing see Shryock (1966, 4). 
9Schwartz (1985, 364) defined this type of cosmology as “essentially a belief that political and social 
irregularities can invoke important disturbances in nature.” See also Dessein (2008). 
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makes heaven (the collective of forefathers) not only the last example of the ruler, 
but also his last judge: it is from heaven that the ruler, the “Son of Heaven”, 
obtains his mandate to rule (tianming), and it therefore also is heaven that can, 
ultimately, withdraw this mandate.
10
 Phrased differently, it is through divine 
approval of his moral virtue––philosophically articulated in the Confucian concept 
ren, “humaneness”––that the “Son of Heaven” maintains his legitimacy to rule.11 
This naturally also explains why ruling has to be based on the wise words of the 
ancestors,
12
 and why ancestral worship––an institution that establishes the 
organization of authority and thus of political alignments and the territorial 
division that comes along with it––developed to be an essential part of Confucian 
state cult.
13
 The Confucian installment of an elaborate system of rules of behavior 
and ritual prescripts that conform to the hierarchical social structure that was 
inherited from the Zhou was instrumental in perpetuating the Confucian system.
14
 
The significance of these rituals was further such that they impacted to commoners 
“a sense of belonging to an ‘imagined community’ of supremely civilized subjects 
of the realm”. (Nylan 2009, 61) The merging of the indigenous Confucian political 
ideology and the age-old acceptance of a divine origin of the “Chinese” people, 
thus created the possibility that the inhabitants of the central plains (zhongyuan)––
elite and commoners alike––imagined themselves and the territory they inhabited 
(Zhongguo) as fundamentally different from the people, creeds and customs of the 
regions surrounding the central plains.  
Discussing the concept “All-under-Heaven” (tianxia), Michael Nylan (2009, 
42–43) remarks that the term “initially referred to the lands and activities under the 
beneficent supervision of the ancestors of the ruling house,” but that “by a fairly 
easy extension, the term later suggested the imagined community that depended 
upon the moral ruler’s exemplary consciousness that he held his lands in trust for 
the ancestors above and the people below”. The unification of China in the 3rd 
century BCE and the elevation of Confucianism to state doctrine thus have been of 
crucial importance in the shaping of the Chinese world view and the Chinese 
interpretation of politics. This new vision of the world is evident from the 
                                                 
10 See on this Schwartz 1985, 23. 
11 For a discussion of ren see Schwartz 1985, 75–85. 
12 See Wechsler 1985,123; Bauer 2006, 37. 
13 See Lloyd and Sivin 2002, 193. 
14 Yu (2005, 51) states that: “Just as the state’s recognition of Confucius and its continual process of 
canonizing his descendants were indicative of its own moral discernment and enlightenment, so the 
designated descendants’s fulfilment of their ritual duties on behalf of the state betokened their 
acknowledgement of the regime’s legitimacy.” See also Nylan 2009, 47. 
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“Prefaces” to the Mao shi version of the Odes which were, when not authored in 
the transitional period from Western to Eastern Han (i.e. ca.50 BCE–50 CE), than 
at least expanded and revised in that period, present the Shijing as one single 
history of the Zhou from its beginning in the 11
th
 century BCE up to 599 BCE, a 
history of Zhongguo, inhabited by the people of Zhou, and surrounded by 
barbarian peoples. In its historical approach, the Mao shi version of the Odes not 
only constitutes a major break with earlier historical works such as the Chunqiu 
(Spring-and-Autumn Annals) or the Shujing (Book of Documents), (see Mittag 
2009, 151–53), but has developed a full-fledged politico-religious narrative. 
Achim Mittag and Fritz-Heiner Mutschler (2009, 439) characterize the impact of 
the unification of the Chinese territory and the installation of Confucian rulership 
as follows:  
In the Chinese view, the beginning of human civilization coincides with the 
emergence of the body politic, i.e. tianxia, “All-under-Heaven”. Thus already 
the Yellow Emperor is said to have received and “possessed” (you) tianxia, 
followed by the sage emperor Yao, who chose his successor Shun to “confer” 
(shou) tianxia upon him. From Shun, tianxia was transmitted to the Great Yu, 
the founder of the semi-legendary Xia dynasty, and thence down to the Shang 
and Zhou dynasties. To be sure, the political and cultural elites of early 
imperial China were well aware that tianxia did not yet cover all the known 
“world”. But the key point is their overriding conception that from the very 
beginning there was a “universal” order which had been established by the 
Five Emperors (wudi) and handed down the ages.
15
 
In fact, this perpetual character of Confucian rule could already be discerned in the 
following two passages from the ode “Sheng min” quoted above: “Truly Hou 
Chi’s husbandry/Followed the way that had been shown (You xiang zhi dao),” and 
“They have gone on till now (Yi qi yu jin)”. These sentences imply that the model 
                                                 
15 This is significantly different from the Roman case. For the Romans of the period of expansion, 
history was a progressive phenomenon, moving towards their domination of the world through 
expansion. (See Mittag and Mutschler 2009, 439) According to Pirazzoli-t’Serstevens (2009, 302), 
although the doctrine of the Mandate of Heaven (tianming) had not been taken into account before 
Emperor Chengdi (r. 33–7 BCE) or as full-fledged theory before Wang Mang (r. 5–23 CE), the 
concept had been operative even before the 1st century BCE. Pines (2009, 78) remarks that “One 
aspect of Mozi’s (and Confucius’) legacy […] was adopted by almost all Zhanguo thinkers and their 
successors: namely, the assertion that a line of sage monarchs presided over the unified realm from 
time immemorial”. 
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set by Houji is also the model to pursue in the future. This, of course, also explains 
why Houji has been bestowed offerings throughout Chinese history.
16
 
We can thus sum up that in the Chinese view, the beginnings of human 
civilization came to be equated with the emergence of “tianxia”––an event that 
already applies to the Yellow Emperor––and that while in the Western Zhou 
period, the term “tianxia” exclusively referred to the royal domain, in the Han 
dynasty it was expanded to include the imagined territory, the inhabitants of which 
modeled themselves on the culture of Zhongguo.
17
 As a consequence, in China, 
politics were always in some sense internal politics. (see Mittag and Mutschler 
2009, 440) This explains why, e.g. the Gongyang zhuan (Gongyang’s 
Commentary on the Chunqiu) presents unification of All-under-Heaven––
including “Chinese” and “barbarian” parts––as the ultimate goal of the true ruler. 
(see Pines 2009, 81) 
That the Confucian state is characterized by an intimate and reciprocal 
relationship between the ruling house, state power, the concept of ‘empire,’ and 
the realm of the divine is well illustrated in the following declaration Emperor 
Yuan of the Han (r. 48–22 BCE) made at the beginning of his reign: 
We make it a point to establish personally our ancestral temple, because this 
is the ultimate power to build up our authority, eliminate the sprouts of 
rebellion, and make the people one. (Ban 1973, Hanshu 10: 3116) (italics 
mine) 
This brings us to the broader political mission of the Chinese Confucian state. 
Commenting on the “Daxue”, (The Great Learning), the 39th chapter of the Liji 
(Records of Ritual), a work compiled in the Han dynasty in the 3
rd–2nd century 
BCE, Wing-tsit Chan (1963, 84) says the following: 
The importance of this little Classic is far greater than its small size would 
suggest. It gives the Confucian educational, moral, and political programs in a 
nutshell, neatly summed up in the so-called “three items”: manifesting the 
clear character of man, loving the people and abiding in the highest good; and 
in the “eight steps”: the investigation of things, extension of knowledge, 
sincerity of the will, rectification of the mind, cultivation of the personal life, 
regulation of the family, national order, and world peace. (italics mine) 
                                                 
16 On the importance of the divine origin of Houji and comparisons with other religions see Waley 
(1954, 239–40). 
17 See Pines (2009, 72), who, in this respect, elaborates on the importance of a Han re-interpretation 
of the Ode “Bei shan” (ode 205) of the Mao shi. 
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For the present discussion, especially the latter two––national order and world 
peace––are important. On this issue, the original text has the following to say:  
The ancients who wished to manifest their clear character to the world would 
first bring order to their states. Those who wished to bring order to their states 
would first regulate their families. Those who wished to regulate their families 
would first cultivate their personal lives. Those who wished to cultivate their 
personal lives would first rectify their minds. Those who wished to rectify 
their minds would first make their wills sincere. Those who wished to make 
their wills sincere would first extend their knowledge. The extension of 
knowledge consists in the investigation of things. When things are 
investigated, knowledge is extended; when knowledge is extended, the will 
becomes sincere; when the will is sincere, the mind is rectified; when the 
mind is rectified, the personal life is cultivated; when the personal life is 
cultivated, the family will be regulated; when the family is regulated, the state 
will be in order; and when the state is in order, there will be peace throughout 
the world. (translation by Wing-tsit Chan 1963, 86–87; italics mine) 
The importance of this passage for Chinese political philosophy is hard to be 
overrated. As Confucianism kept its function of state doctrine throughout China’s 
imperial history––viz. to the beginning of the 20th century––generations of 
political thinkers have commented on the precise meaning of the text. In his 
appreciation of the “Daxue”, the famous Neo-Confucian philosopher Zhu Xi 
(1130–1200) states: 
What is meant by saying that in order to govern the state it is necessary to 
regulate the family is this: There is no one who cannot teach his own family 
and yet teach others. Therefore the superior man (ruler) without going beyond 
his family, can bring education into completion in the whole state. Filial piety 
is that with which one serves his ruler. Brotherly respect is that with which 
one serves his elders, and deep love is that with which one treats the multitude. 
[…] When the individual families have become humane, then the whole 
country will be aroused toward humanity. When the individual families have 
become compliant, then the whole country will be aroused toward compliance. 
[…] Therefore the superior man must have the good qualities in himself 
before he may require them in other people. […] Therefore the order of the 
state depends on the regulation of the family. […] Only when one has rightly 
ordered his household can he teach the people of the country. […] Because he 
served as a worthy example as a father, son, elder brother, and younger 
brother, therefore the people imitated him. This is what is meant by saying 
that the order of the state depends on the regulation of the family.
18
  
                                                 
18 Translated by Wing-tsit Chan 1963, 91–92; italics mine. 
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A ruler is thus presented as having the task to cultivate himself according to the 
Confucian (divine) moral principles, in order to influence his state and the world at 
large (tianxia). In this lies a politico-religious mission of the “Son of Heaven” and 
of Zhongguo. Fei Xiaotong (1992, 62–63) illustrated the political view that is 
expressed in the “Daxue” with the metaphor of the concentric circles that appear 
when throwing a rock into the water. For an individual, the concentric circles of 
his individual moral and social behavior are the product of his potential moral 
autonomy. When an individual develops his moral potentiality, he can increase his 
impact on other individuals and, hence, his value in society. Society thus both is 
the inspiration and the aim of an individual’s existence (Shun 2004, 190–93),19 and 
the value of an individual is measured by his value for society (Fei 1992, 67). In 
the same way as each individual is at the center of the circles produced by his or 
her own social influence, also each state is at the center of the concentric circles of 
its moral and political influence. The morality of a state expands to the world at 
large, to “All-under-Heaven”. Applied to international relations, this viewpoint 
was traditionally interpreted as that when the ruler, the “Son of Heaven”, 
successfully safeguards the harmonious (cosmological) relations in his state 
through his superb Confucian behavior, this influence would extend to the 
neighboring territories, the so-called “tribute states”, with China, the “Middle 
Kingdom” at the center.
20
 The relation between Zhongguo and the bordering 
regions was interpreted as the relation between an older brother and a younger 
brother, in which China is the older brother and the non-Chinese territories are the 
younger brothers. As in a family, the older brother sets the moral example for the 
younger, and the younger brother follows this example. As with individual 
relations, “All-under-Heaven” is both the inspiration and the aim of China’s 
existence, and economic and political relations with the so-called “tribute states” 
were philosophized in similar terms (Fairbank 1942, 137–39). While China 
interpreted the existence of these tribute relations as a proof that the Chinese 
emperor excelled in Confucian virtue––which added to the cultural prestige of the 
empire and thus also served an internal political agenda, for the so-called “tribute 
states”, these “tribute relations” were primarily of economic importance. For them, 
engaging in a “tribute relation” with China, the regionally most important political 
                                                 
19 See also Schwartz 1985, 113. 
20 Schmidt-Glintzer (2009, 179) remarks that already in the “Yu gong” chapter of the Shanhai jing 
(Classic of Mountains and Seas), the world is represented as consisting of five concentric zones: the 
royal domain, the domains of the princes, the pacification zone, the zone of allied barbarians, and the 
zone of savagery. 
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and economic power, was a necessary condition to be able to establish commercial 
relations. In periods in which the cultural luster of the Chinese Confucian elite in 
the capital was waning, the “cultural model” based on moral virtue no longer 
worked. As a result, the Chinese political elite could no longer maintain its cultural 
authority over the bordering territories and also the “tribute states” no longer had a 
political, economic or cultural profit in maintaining their relations with China. The 
more recent and the less thorough the connection with China had been, the easier 
Chinese culture disappeared again. (Fairbank and Teng 1941, 129–30) It can 
therefore be argued that Chinese history is a continuous movement of slowly 
surging and retreating concentric circles of cultural Han influence. 
Reconsidering Confucianism––Phase One 
Although the intellectual climate of the end of the 19
th
 and the early 20
th
 century is 
characterized by a profound self-doubt and culture criticism (Jansen 2009, 402), 
the perception that there is a connection between Confucianism as moral guideline 
and national power continued to linger on, even after the fall of the Qing Empire 
in 1911. As remarked by Julia Schneider (2012, 54): 
At the same time Han Chinese scholars began to think about the validity of 
their own historical models based on Confucian philosophy like historical 
atrophy (lishi tuihua), a belief in the great achievements of the so-called 
Golden Age and the general notion that the past could provide a model for 
present-day politic
21
 continued.  
The ambivalence between the notion of China as model state and the conviction 
that the traditional Confucian state had to be overturned in order to create a 
modern nation-state, is also evident from Liang Qichao’s (1873–1929) claim that 
the new nation-state that had to be built from the rumble of the multi-ethnic Qing 
dynasty should not mean that “several equally powerful peoples live next to and 
with each other in One State”, but that “One People (Eine Nation)” should take a 
superior position among them. (Schneider 2012, 61) It is very likely that Liang 
Qichao was herein heavily influenced by the theories of Johann Kaspar Bluntschli 
who, in his Lehre vom modernen Staat of 1886, had claimed that such a 
nationalization can only be successful where “die herrschende Nation den übrigen 
an Bildung, Geist und Macht entschieden überlegen ist” (Bluntschli 1965, 1: 
                                                 
21 See also Moloughney and Zarrow 2012, 4. 
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109).
22
 Similarly, Liang Qichao ascribed to the Han the same role Bluntschli had 
ascribed to the “Aryans”, i.e., that they were destined to be the guides for all 
people around them and lead them to the nation-state. The distinction Liang 
Qichao makes between “small nationalism” (xiao minzhu zhuyi) and “great 
nationalism” (da minzu zhuyi), and his claim that it is “large nationalism” that is to 
be supported, reveals that he also adhered to the “international” dimension of the 
Han concept of “All-under-Heaven”. With “small nationalism”, he refers to the 
sentiment of the Han people towards other ethnicities inside the borders of the 
former Qing empire (guonei), while “great nationalism” refers to the sentiments of 
all people towards all people outside the borders of the former Qing empire 
(guowai). (Liang 1983b, 75)
23
 Reminiscent of the Confucian idea that “China” is 
the “model” for others to emulate, he here introduces the concept of China’s 
“assimilative power” (Zhongguo tonghuali). This “power” is the power of superior 
ethnicities (i.c. the Han) to “swallow inferior weak ethnicities and wipe their 
frontiers” (Liang 1983a, 11).24 He therefore meaningfully appeals to his readers 
with the following words: 
[…] unite Han, unite Manchus, unite Mongols, unite Turkish Muslims, unite 
Miao, unite Tibetans and form one large nation (yi da minzu). Then we will 
form one third of the world’s population. And we will extend widely about the 
five continents.
 25
 (Liang 1983b, 76) 
And he specifies  
If this [unification] is really achieved, then this large nation (da minzu) has to 
take the Han people as their centre (zhong xindian). Moreover, their 
organization has to be formed by the hands of the Han people. About this fact, 
one cannot argue. (Liang 1983b, 76)
26
 
                                                 
22 See also Bluntschli 1965, vol.1: 108: “Die Tendenz des Staates, gestüzt auf die hervorragende 
Kultur einer Nationalität, allmählich die anderen nationalen Elemente zu assimilieren und dadurch 
das ganze Volk zu einer Nation umzuwandeln […]”. See also Schneider 2012, 61–63. 
23 See also Schneider 2012, 66–67. 
24 Bluntschli (1874, 41) gives the simile of casting iron: “The civilizations of the world were all 
completed through mutual teaching and mutual guidance of all kinds of ethnicities (zhu zhong minzu). 
Regarding the affairs of a single state they are also often achieved and improved through the help and 
assistance of other ethnicities. [This is] like the casting of coins: one does not only use pure gold and 
silver, but also mixes and adds one or two cheap metals. Only then the coins are quite complete, and 
the lines and colours are prettier” (translated by Schneider 2012, 61). 
25 Translated by Schneider 2012, 69. 
26 Translated by Schneider 2012, 69. 
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This political ideal is in line with the concept of an “ancestral state” as defined by 
Anthony C. Yu (2005, 146): a state which “in its demand for total and 
unconditional submission exists to make the people one (yi min) by erasing all 
differences––whether ethnic, cultural, political, or linguistic” (italics mine). The 
awareness that Han civilization can serve as a model, and the conviction that 
ethnicity (minzu) is fundamental in the creation of a Chinese nation-state is also 
apparent in Sun Zhongshan’s (1866–1925) claim that “China has been a state 
comprised of one people since the Qin and Han Dynasties”; (Sun 1974, 186) and 
in his understanding that ethnicity (minzu) is synonymous with guozu, “statism”. 
When Sun Zhongshan, in his inaugural speech on the first congress of the 
Nationalist Party in 1912, declared that he no longer wanted to “govern” the state 
through the Party (yi dang zhi guo), but to “establish” it through the Party (yi dang 
jian guo), he gave expression to his conviction that the Nationalist Party had 
developed from an ideological movement to an instrument of power politics, i.e. in 
the same way that the Qin and the Han had united the then “tianxia”, also now the 
“Chinese” world had to be “re-united” before it could be governed. (Fitzgerald 
1996, 185) As a consequence, nationalist feelings for the state were identified with 
the Nationalist Party as the incarnation of this new state, a situation that is 
reflected in the term dangguo, “party state”.27 As a result, the only way for the 
citizens to respond to the nationalist appeal and to contribute to the “establishment 
of the state” was to become member of the Nationalist Party, viz. the instrument to 
establish the state and to make the people one.
28
 
Reconsidering Confucianism––Phase Two 
Although the Chinese Communist Party (hereafter CCP) had appealed itself to Sun 
Zhongshan’s Han nationalist ideology in its resistance against Japan, once having 
come to power in 1949, it turned to Marxism-Leninism to build up a “New China”, 
now called “Zhonghua renmin gongheguo” (People’s Republic of China). In 
contradistinction to the concept “Zhongguo” that essentially refers to the “central 
plains” (zhongyuan), the term “zhonghua” in “Zhonghua renmin gongheguo” 
denotes the assembly of the fifty-six ethnic groups that live in the territory of the 
                                                 
27Notice the combination of “guo” “(nation-)state” with “min,” “people”––the “min” of “minzu 
zhuyi”, “nationalism”, in the term “Guomindang”. 
28 Notice that also Kang Youwei’s (1858–1927) appeal to the Chinese huaqiao in Southeast Asia to 
contribute to the build-up of the national industry reveals his conviction that the primary loyalty of 
the huaqiao was to their native homeland. On the importance of redefining the notion of huaqiao in 
terms of loyalty to the Chinese nation-state, see Harrison 2001, 110. 
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former Qing empire.
29
 In a broader sense, building on the concept “huaqiao” as it 
was defined in the Republican period, this new name also comprises the overseas 
Chinese, and the people of Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan.
30
 The choice for 
Marxism-Leninism was not self-evident: Marx and Engels had anticipated that a 
workers’ revolution would occur in a highly developed capitalist society, after 
which a socialist state would be installed whose primary function would be the 
equalization of wealth rather than dealing with the problem of production. (Chang 
2001, 142–43) In 1949, China was far from being a capitalist industrialized nation. 
Marxism did provide an answer, though, for the apparent insolvable difficulty of 
“making the people one”, viz., of bringing the Han and the different non-Han 
peoples of the former Qing empire into one nation-state: the Marxist emphasis on 
class struggle enabled the equation of all the different ethnic groups of the former 
empire as, in the class struggle, not the opposition between the various ethnic 
groups and the Han is highlighted as the most fundamental opposition, but the 
class differences within each of these individual ethnic groups. In its appeal to the 
Marxist class struggle, the CCP pictured itself as the representative of the 
modernistic vanguard that assists the Han and non-Han alike to realize their own 
liberation within a reunited classless nation state.
31
 In its appeal to the nation, the 
CCP “party state” (dangguo) replaced the Han ethnic party state of the 
Nationalists.
32
 The fact that the CCP was (and still is) an above all Han dominated 
organization gives its vocation to be the vanguard of modernization a flavor of 
                                                 
29 Chang (2001, 45), explains: “‘Huaxia’ was the earliest name for the Chinese people until it was 
supplanted by ‘Hanren’ (People of Han). Today, ‘Huaxia’ denotes a cultural identity; whereas Han is 
an ethnic term, differentiating the Han from the other ethnic groups in the People’s Republic of 
China. As scholars of the People’s Republic of China insist, ‘The Chinese culture, with Huaxia as its 
core ... includes the cultures of all the members of the big family of the Chinese nation’, but the 
‘Han race (Hanzu)’ is China’s ‘mainstream or host (zhuti) nation’. Contemporary Chinese call 
themselves Huaren (Hua people), and the overseas diaspora Chinese call themselves Huayi (Hua 
posterity). The combination of ‘Zhongyuan’ (Central Plains), the word from which the concept 
‘Zhongguo’ [...] is derived, and ‘Huaxia’ produces ‘Zhonghua’ (China or Chinese), a word that is 
also part of the name ‘Zhonghua Minguo’ (Republic of China).” 
30 Therefore, Fitzgerald 1996, 57, claims that the People’s Republic of China is a state without nation, 
since, with the unity as state, there is no corresponding uniform nation. 
31 Chen Duxiu (1880–1942), a founder of the CCP, wrote in Xin Qingnian Vol.VIII/1 (September 
1920): “I recognize the existence of only two nations, that of the capitalists, and that of the workers;” 
and “At present, the ‘nation’ of the workers exists only in the Soviet Union. Everywhere else we 
have the ‘nation’ of the capitalists.” Quoted from Schwartz 1968, 28. See also Fitzgerald 1996, 321, 
348. 
32 Fitzgerald (1996, 348) remarks: “The question at issue was how to essentialize the national self, 
which was to be represented by the state and awakened as a mass community”. It has, in this respect, 
been proven that building one single political party is more efficient for political institutionalization 
than immediately to proceed to a multiparty system is. See Huntington 1971, 478. 
Bart DESSEIN: Faith and Politics: (New) Confucianism as Civil Religion 
54 
patronism and, in some sense, re-introduces the old culturalist idea that the Han 
are the older brothers to whom the different ethnic groups stand in an older 
brother-younger brother relation. Put differently, the degree to which the People’s 
Republic of China becomes a modern state depends on the CCP’s success to bring 
all its citizens to the level of development of the Han. (Nimni 1995, 57–61) 
When Mao Zedong died on 9 September 1976, China was not more a fully 
industrialized nation than it had been when he had come to power. In order to lift 
the country out of the dire economic state in which it had fallen, Deng Xiaoping 
(1904–1993) emphasized the concept of “productive forces” as, according to him, 
it was industrial development that had to make China into a modern nation-state. 
This new emphasis enabled him to bring economic reforms into a Marxist 
framework, as “productive forces” encompasses more than only the working class, 
and gives room for the introduction of capitalist instruments. In order to attract 
“foreign” knowledge and capital, just as Kang Youwei had done earlier, also Deng 
Xiaoping appealed to the huaqiao. In his claim that: “No matter what clothes they 
wear or what political stand they take, all Chinese have a sense of pride and 
identification with the Chinese nation and would want the People’s Republic of 
China to become strong and prosperous” (Deng 1987, 51)33, he not only focused 
on their Han ethnicity, but also on their connection to the “Chinese nation”. 
Reconsidering Confucianism––Phase Three 
Dengist economic reforms that started at the end of the 1970s have led to an 
unprecedented economic growth of one single country in such a short time span. 
Capitalist economic development has, however, also increased the wealth gap 
between different social groups in Chinese society. It is not without importance 
that those people who have suffered the most from economic reforms and social 
inequality in the new era, are not seldom precisely those people who were the 
greatest advocators of CCP rule in the Maoist era. This, combined with the fact 
that, in China, it is the CCP that is engineering a capitalist economic model, have 
questioned the communist identity of the Party among some groups of Chinese 
society. The greater degree of autonomy in the economic domain has also fed 
ethnic nationalism among some ethnic groups that feel themselves supported in 
their “uniqueness”. This is especially true for those regions that had enjoyed a 
greater degree of autonomy also under Qing rule: Xinjiang, Mongolia and Tibet, 
                                                 
33 See also note # 27. 
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i.e. regions at the far end of the concentric circles of China’s “tianxia”. This 
growing ethnic unrest, the fact that the Party increasingly co-operates with the 
West to achieve its economic goals, and the growing involvement of China in 
bodies of global governance, have called into question the historical “nationalist” 
claim of the CCP. 
Against the background of growing social disparity and ethnic tension, and a 
diminished “national(ist)” appeal of the Party, a revaluation of traditional Chinese 
culture in the People’s Republic of China that started with the condemnation of the 
Gang of Four and of their iconoclastic policies, has become increasingly apparent. 
(Bresciani 2001, 420) This revaluation is sustained by the fact that while in the 
Republican period and in the first decades of the People’s Republic traditional 
Confucian culture was portrayed as an obstacle for development, in much of 
Southeast Asia (the so-called Asian tigers) the presence of elements of traditional 
Chinese culture, often labeled “Confucianism”, is commonly seen as the reason of 
the success of business and commerce within the Chinese communities in these 
regions. (Harrison 2001, 262) The fact that, as argued above, Confucian memory 
has, in fact, never disappeared, helps to explain the success of this revaluation.
34
 
This reappraisal of Confucian values goes hand in hand with the Party’s patriotic 
stance. Patriotism affects the nation-state as a whole, not a single national/ethnic 
group. In this respect, the Marxist emphasis on class struggle is seen as contrary to 
Confucianism that is an ideology of harmony. Re-installing a “Confucian” 
harmonious society (hexie shehui) thus entails a renewal of the traditional Chinese 
values.
35
 Moreover, as the CCP is, through the concept of “dangguo”, identified 
with the People’s Republic, patriotism also affirms its position as ruling party and 
can serve as an instrument to counter the centrifugal powers of ethnic nationalism. 
Historical memory is an important element in this: it is the CCP that, after the 
period of Western domination, reunified China. A weakened position of the Party 
is therefore portrayed as a virtual threat to territorial unity as in these 
circumstances, China might, once again, fall prey to Western dominance.
36
 In its 
                                                 
34 It may, here, also be reminded that also during the Maoist years, Confucius was studied 
assiduously, be it in order to criticize him (Bresciani 2001, 419). 
35 Although there is no direct reference to the concept “hexie shehui” in the Confucian literature, the 
concept is generally accepted to be related to the concept “brotherhood” (datong) of chapter VII, Li 
yun, of the Liji. 
36 Already Deng Xiaoping cautioned that if China were to descend into “turmoil”, the situation 
would be far worse than during the Cultural Revolution because the country no longer had 
“prestigious leaders” like Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai to hold it together. Chang (2001, 163) 
suggests that this is also the reason why Deng Xiaoping did not completely denounce Mao Zedong, 
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continued emphasis of its role as binding factor in the Chinese nation-state, 
patriotism is thus further complemented with nationalism. (Rainey 2010, 181–83) 
The state’s renewed interest for Confucianism is, e.g. also evident in the term 
“xiaokang shehui” that refers to the economic policy of the Hu Jintao era. While 
the concept “xiaokang shehui” builds on the 7th chapter of the Han dynasty 
Confucian classic Liji (Dessein 2011) the term “xiaokang” itself already appears in 
the ode “Min lao” (The People Are Hard Pressed) of the part Daya of the Shijing 
(Part III, Book II, 9). In the translation by James Legge (1970, 495), the first 
stanza of the ode goes as follows:  
The people indeed are heavily burdened,  
But perhaps a little ease (xiaokang) may be got for them.  
Let us cherish this centre of the kingdom,  
To secure the repose of the four quarters of it.  
Let us give no indulgence to the wily and obsequious,  
In order to make the unconscientious careful,  
And to repress robbers and oppressors,  
Who Have no fear of the clear will [of Heaven].  
Then let us show kindness to those who are distant,  
And help those who are near;––  
Thus establishing [the throne of] our king. (italics mine) 
The message the contemporary concept “Xiaokang shehui” thus conveys contains 
ample elements we also discerned in the Ode “Min sheng” discussed in the 
beginning of this article. In the context of contemporary economic and social 
developments, these are that (1) the masses of the people resort to a moral 
leadership (“cherish this centre of the kingdom”) that will (2) guide them to a 
peaceful era through economic development and social redistribution (“a little ease 
may be got for them”); that this is (3) modeled on ancient models (“have no fear of 
the clear will of Heaven”), and that (4) will be the model for the homeland and 
internationally (“show kindness to those who are distant, and help those who are 
near”), and, as such (5) be a model for the world at large (“establishing the throne 
of our king”).  
The politico-religious mission of this contemporary emphasis on patriotism 
and nationalism goes along with a reappraisal of the past––China’s 5,000 years 
                                                                                                                           
and why, although he did not seem to object to Western democracy in principle, he rejected it in 
practice. 
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long history. This can be seen in the following statement by Liu Qi, then member 
of the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party and president of the 
organizational committee of the Beijing Olympic Games, done at the occasion of 
the launching of the Olympic Slogan “One People, One Dream” on 21 April 2006. 
Liu Qi commented on the Olympic slogan as follows: 
It is a slogan that conveys the lofty ideal of people in Beijing as well as in 
China to share the global community and civilization and to create a bright 
future hand in hand with people from the rest of the world. It expresses the 
firm belief of a great nation, with a long history of 5,000 years and on its way 
towards modernization, that is committed to peaceful development, a 
harmonious society and people’s happiness. 
This comment contains three important claims with respect to the present 
discussion: (1) the concept of a Chinese nation that has a history of 5,000 years; (2) 
China’s desire to become part of a peaceful globalized world; and (3) the claim 
that it is modernization that will lead to a national and international harmonious 
society. This ideal has, in 2013, been rephrased as the “Chinese Dream” by the 
present leadership. 
New Confucianism as Civil Religion 
The three claims contained in Liu Qi’s statement are exponent of two types of 
“nationalism”: cultural nationalism that is rooted in China’s history, and political 
nationalism that originated along with the modernization concept in the early 20
th
 
century. While, e.g., Tu Weiming (1989) interprets the Confucian revival as a 
search for cultural roots and thus as a spontaneous event, the reappraisal of 
Confucianism by the ruling CCP undeniably also is to be explained as a symptom 
of the necessity for an instrument to boast feelings of nationalism and patriotism.37 
Indeed, as claimed by Harvey Nelson (2000, 227), apart from some traditional 
family values, Confucianism has lost its ability to really rally the contemporary 
Chinese citizens. Against the background of a faltering Marxism-Leninism, the 
contemporary revival of Confucianism in China has therefore above all to be 
interpreted as a deliberate movement by the government to fuse superficial popular 
sentiments and a longing for “golden pre-Marxist-Leninist times” (Chen 2005, 51) 
with its official rhetoric. In an increasingly globalized world and its concomitant 
search for national identity, Han culture is, by the ruling CCP, defined as an 
                                                 
37 On the issue of the difference between bottom-up and top-down political nationalism (Kruithof 
2000, 233–34). 
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essential part of Chinese identity, and, although in the not too far past, Confucius 
was condemned as a reactionary enemy, he is now increasingly embraced. In this 
process, further, the CCP’s nationalist and patriotic stance and popular nationalism 
may enhance one another. The recuperation of popular Confucian sentiment by the 
ruling CCP makes PRC New Confucianism different from its counterpart on 
Taiwan: despite the fact that also the Nationalist Party had grown out of the May 
Fourth Movement, Nationalist rule on Taiwan did not comprise the same intense 
repression of traditional values as they had to witness during the decades of 
Marxist-Leninist “iconoclastic nationalism”. 
A highly remarkable cultural site in this respect is the “Huangdi guli” (Old site 
of the Yellow Emperor) in Xinzheng, Henan Province. On the site, the visitor is 
guided along a series of square pillars on each side of which a short introduction is 
given to one of the fify-six officially recognized ethnic groups that live on the 
Chinese territory, and along a sacrificial vessel in the style of a Zhou dynasty 
tripod. The route eventually leads to a statue of the Yellow Emperor. This site is, 
as it were, an incarnation of the traditional Confucian political ideology: all 
ethnicities in “tianxia” merge into the Yellow Emperor. The description of the site 
on its website reads as follows: 
In order to exhalt the magnificent traditional culture of the Chinese people 
(Zhonghua minzu), to show the magnificence of the culture that has its basis 
in Henan, and to create a holy place where the Hua-people of the whole world 
can search for their roots and are able to show respect to their ancestors, the 
town of Xinzheng, supported by the highest authorities and the descendants of 
Yanhuang
38
 within China and abroad, has created a cultural site in order to 
vehemently exploit the culture of the Yellow Emperor. After the 90s of the 
20
th
 century, enlargement and embellishment projects have continuously been 
set up in the scenic site of Huangdi guli, whereby the present area of the 
domain is more than 70,000 square meter. […] The present scenic site 
Huangdi guli […] is a holy place where the descendents of Yanhuang from 
within the country and abroad can show respect to their ancestors and can 
search for their roots. It has an enormous appeal on the descendents of 
Yanhuang, and brings [them] together. It incorporates the spirit of Zhonghua 
and the roots of the ethnicities. The scenic site Huangdi guli is an important 
national protected cultural unity, a scenic site of the national AAAA-
                                                 
38 “Huang” in the term “yuangyan” refers to Huangdi, the Yellow Emperor; “yan” refers to Yandi: 
Emperor Yan. According to legend, Yandi and Huangdi ruled over conquering territories. In a battle 
between them, Yandi was beaten by Huangdi, whereafter the people of both territories amalgamated 
to the “Huaxia”. In this sense, both Huangdi and Yandi are seen as the ancestors of the Huaxia. (See 
also note # 27) 
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categorie,
39
 a base for patriotic education of the Chinese huaqiao, a base for 
patriotic education of the province of Henan, one of the ten outstanding 
touristic scenic sites of the city of Zhengzhou, a base for the patriotic 
education of the youth of the city of Zhengzhou, etc. […] The ceremony of 
showing respect in Huangdi guli is categorized in the second section of the 
catalogue of immaterial cultural inheritance of China. Huangdi guli gradually 
has become the spiritual cradle of the descendants of Yanhuang within this 
country and abroad, a holy place where the ethnic groups search for their 
roots, and show respect to their ancestors, the spiritual homeland of the 
Chinese people. (Own translation; italics mine) (Huangdi guli)  
The text on this site thus connects the mythical origin of the Chinese people––the 
Yellow Emperor––to the contemporary Chinese nation-state. We can also reiterate 
here, as discussed above, that the Chinese view is that human civilization started 
with the emergence of the concept of “tianxia”, and that the Yellow Emperor is 
said to have received and possessed “All-under-Heaven” as, from the very 
beginning, there was a “universal” order “which had been established by the Five 
Emperors (di) and handed down the ages” (Mittag and Mutschler 2009, 439). Or 
how, as remarked by Martin Kern (2009, 226): “Through remembrance, history 
turns into myth,” whereby “it does not become unreal but, on the contrary, and 
only then, reality in the sense of a continual normative and formative force”.
40
 
In the same way as Han dynasty Confucianism was shaped within the 
framework of the religious-cultural heritage of the Zhou dynasty and created the 
idea of a “national” unity and continuity that started with the Yellow Emperor, 
contemporary political historiography connects the mission of the unified Chinese 
nation-state to inherited politico-religious narratives. Where, as argued by 
Michelle A. Gonzalez (2012, 571), politicians in liberal democracies are 
acknowledging the political functioning of religious believers and have become 
increasingly aware of it that religion can be manipulated in order to attract voters 
because voters with religious values vote for politicians of whom they think they 
share the same religious values, in authoritarian states––the People’s Republic of 
China being an example in case––political theology is an instrument used by the 
ruling authorities to ensure the stability of the state through appealing to the 
                                                 
39 The highest category is AAAAA. 
40 With respect to pre-imperial bronze inscriptions, Kern (2009, 226) remarks that these inscriptions 
“commemorated and preserved but the sacralized distillate of history, creating a representation of the 
past that was as radically abbreviated as it was profoundly ideological. […] the rhetoric of the 
inscriptions […] annihilated the multi-perspective records of all the former states and replaced them 
with the single and central perspective of the universal ruler. They silenced the many voices of 
history and monopolized memory”. 
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population’s patriotic sentiments for a divine nation. Seen from the other side of 
the electoral process, where liberal democracies are characterized by the fact that 
interest groups may elect individuals based on theology with the perception that 
this will lead to their theological worldview being represented in government, in 
authoritarian states, the support of the people for the government is a product of 
the degree to which the people perceive the government to bring its historic 
mission to a good end. (Bellah 2006, 228) In China, therefore, the contemporary 
politico-religious narrative appeals on the Chinese citizens as heirs of a divine 
tradition, and as responsible to bring the divine mission of the nation to a good end. 
Expressions, symbols, and rituals that are part of a collective “Confucian” memory 
are used as part of a Confucian “civil religion” that has to affirm, among other 
things, the CCP’s “religious legitimation” as the highest political authority, and, in 
line with the concept of “cosmological Confucianism”, this authority is presented 
as only being able to fulfill its mission of realizing the “Chinese Dream” with the 
support of the people, that is, loyalty to the Party. Confucianism thus is an 
instrument that presents the modern Chinese nation-state and its policies as sacred 
institutions under the divine rulership of the CCP. 
Also on an international level, Confucianism as civil religion can bring the 
country close to the idea that it serves a divine will––in the same way that civil 
religion in the American context combines an emphasis on the blessedness of the 
nation with its role as an agent of good in the world, and, as a result, gives 
government divine authority and makes the president appear as “the high-priest of 
the US as blessed nation”. (Gonzalez 2012, 572) This perception explains why the 
revaluation of Confucianism––at least in the minds of some New Confucians––has 
given rise to the idea that the rest of the world should be convinced of the values 
of Confucianism, and that a symbiosis between western values and Confucian 
values is the way out of an alleged 21
st
 century moral and political degeneration. 
The “Confucianized” CCP nation-state is thus also presented as the legitimate 
successor to the empire––a model to be emulated (see also Kahn 2011, 2).
41
  
Through the contemporary politico-religious and historical narratives, New 
Confucianism can thus be interpreted as a constitutive element of a ‘civil religion 
with Chinese characteristics’. Just as in the American case, civil religion can be 
used as an instrument to manipulate and change perceptions about how the United 
                                                 
41 Tamney and Chiang (2002, 74) called this kind of Confucianism a “stripped-down version of 
Confucianism”. 
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States act as a Christian nation and can come dangerously close to presenting the 
United States as embodying God’s will, for the Chinese case, Confucianism takes 
this role. The diverse religious makeup of the different people in the Chinese 
nation-state are erased in this narrative, leaving only the false notion that China is 
a Confucian nation, the same way as the United States would be a Christian nation. 
As remarked by Paul W. Kahn’s (2011: 23), “In a crisis, it remains true today that 
the secular state does not hesitate to speak of sacrifice, patriotism, nationalism, and 
homeland in the language of the sacred.”  
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